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Introduction 
In Unfit for the Future Persson and Savulescu describe the inadequacies in normal 
moral judgement (Persson and Savulescu 2012). Normal moral judgement fails to deal with 
certain major problems, they claim, because it involves a bias towards outcomes in the near 
future, an indifference to the suffering of great numbers, a bias against the relevance of 
omissions relative to acts, and a bias against collective contributions to harm. Persson and 
Savulescu suggest that avoiding catastrophes such as climate change and nuclear war 
requires the extensive application of moral education to address the deficits of normal moral 
judgement and to inculcate “norms that are conducive to the good of the world community” 
(Persson and Savulescu 2012: 123). However, they believe that extensive moral education 
might not be sufficient to avert disaster. They suggest that given the seriousness of the 
situation the possibility of moral bioenhancement should also be considered. 
In an interesting response to Persson and Savulescu, “Moral Bioenhancement is 
Dangerous,” Nicholas Agar (2015) argues that moral bioenhancement is dangerous as it will 
almost certainly result in mistaken moral judgements. Agar holds that normal moral 
judgement should be “privileged” because it involves the application of various moral 
subcapacities in a balanced way. He argues that moral bioenhancement would increase 
moral subcapacities in an unbalanced way and that, as a result, mistaken moral judgements 
are likely to occur. He concludes that moral bioenhancement is dangerous, and does so with 
2 
 
 
 
a high degree of certainty: morally worse outcomes are “almost inevitable.” I will argue that 
Agar gives insufficient justification for this conclusion. 
In the section “Clarifying the argument,” I discuss an ambiguity in Agar’s view of 
normal moral judgement and give my reasons for treating moral subcapacity balance as the 
basis of his argument. I then argue that Agar’s thesis that moral bioenhancement is likely to 
result in incorrect moral judgements fails in two ways. First, in the section “A false 
trichotomy,” I argue against Agar’s assertion that a higher than normal level of a particular 
moral subcapacity is dangerous. I suggest that Agar employs a false trichotomy in implying 
that moral subcapacities are categorised as deficient, normal and excessive. I argue that 
levels of particular subcapacities can be higher than normal without being excessive, and 
that these higher levels can be desirable; and that there is not sufficient reason to think that 
moral bioenhancement is likely to leapfrog desirable higher levels and arrive at excessive 
levels.1 Second, in the section “Against normal moral judgement,” I argue that there is good 
reason for thinking that Persson and Savulescu are right and Agar wrong about the 
likelihood of normal moral judgement being correct. If normal moral judgement is not as 
likely to be correct as Agar thinks, his thesis that non-normal moral judgements resulting 
 
1 Psychologists speak of capacities as having “levels.” A capacity is the potential to 
accomplish a particular task. Take, for example, Simon Baron-Cohen’s definition of empathy as the 
ability to recognise and respond appropriately to the thoughts and feelings of others (Baron-Cohen 
2011). We can say then that a person can have more or less ability than normal to recognise and 
respond appropriately to the thoughts and feelings of others, can thus have “more” or “less” empathy 
than normal and can be said to have a “high level” or “low level” of empathy. Likewise, if the 
capacity of moral reasoning is the ability to understand moral arguments and reach reasoned 
conclusions, a person may have more or less ability to do this than normal, and thus may have a 
“high level” or “low level” of the capacity for moral reasoning. We can thus speak of people with the 
lowest or highest relative levels of a moral subcapacity as having an “extremely low level” or 
“extremely high level” of that subcapacity. I use the term “extreme” on its own in this paper to refer 
to extremely high levels of subcapacities, so that, for example, “extreme empathy” refers to an 
extremely high level of empathy. 
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from moral bioenhancement would be dangerous is weakened. I conclude that Agar does 
not give sufficient reason to think that moral bioenhancement is dangerous. I will not, 
however, argue that moral bioenhancement is safe, desirable or necessary. 
Clarifying the argument 
Persson and Savulescu hold that normal moral judgement is problematic because it 
involves systematic biases which mean that it fails to sufficiently respond to possible 
catastrophes such as anthropogenic climate change or nuclear war. Agar holds in contrast 
that moral normalcy should be “privileged,” and morally normal people are “reference 
points.” “They are reference points not because they are necessarily morally correct... But 
they possess the cognitive, emotional and motivational capacities required to grasp moral 
arguments and to implement their conclusions.” 
Agar’s argument involves some ambiguity, as his reason for privileging normal 
moral judgement, that it involves the capacities required to understand and implement 
moral arguments, implies that the morally bioenhanced will lack those capacities. However, 
in all of Agar’s examples of dangerous moral judgements he believes the morally 
bioenhanced are likely to arrive at, the morally bioenhanced do have at least normal levels 
of those capacities. In the case of morally bioenhanced persons he believes likely to become 
terrorists, Agar states that they have exceptional ability to understand and implement moral 
arguments; it is precisely that exceptional ability that Agar says is dangerous in that case. It 
seems then that the danger of moral bioenhancement is not that the morally bioenhanced 
will be unable to understand moral arguments and implement their conclusions. 
At the conclusion of his paper Agar states that “It is the bypassing of reason that 
makes moral bioenhancement so unlikely to succeed.” This implies that the problem with 
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moral bioenhancement is that improvements in a person’s moral judgement are dangerous 
unless they are the result of her reasoning about moral questions. On this interpretation of 
Agar’s position, normal moral judgement is often incorrect, but is more likely to be correct 
than bioenhanced moral judgement as the latter improves moral capacities by non-rational 
means: the empathy, reasoning and commitment of the morally bioenhanced are likely to 
result in incorrect moral judgements as they have not been developed through the 
application of reason. 
Although I feel this may be the most charitable interpretation of Agar’s view, and it 
has the virtue of avoiding the contradiction between his view that the morally normal are 
reference points because they have the ability to understand and implement moral 
arguments and his examples of dangerous morally bioenhanced persons who nevertheless 
also have at least normal levels of that ability, it remains problematic. This is because the 
substance of Agar’s argument does not deal with the issue of whether moral 
bioenhancement will bypass reason. The substance of Agar’s argument is instead that the 
moral judgement of morally bioenhanced persons is far more likely to be incorrect than the 
moral judgements of normal persons as normal people have balanced moral subcapacities 
and the morally bioenhanced are likely to have imbalanced moral subcapacities. I will 
therefore focus not on the issue of moral bioenhancement bypassing reason but on the issue 
of subcapacity balance. 
A false trichotomy 
Agar argues that correct moral judgements are the result of a balance of moral 
subcapacities. He does not specify these, but his paper includes mention of broad empathy 
(empathy for a wide range of persons or beings), deep empathy (strong empathy for a 
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narrow range of persons or beings with whom one is familiar), reasoning and moral 
commitment (the ability to act on one’s moral judgements). 
Agar argues that in normal people it is the relative levels of a person’s moral 
subcapacities, not the absolute levels, which determine the quality of his or her moral 
judgement. So whereas the moral judgement of a psychopath may benefit from an increase 
in empathy to a normal level, the moral judgement of a person with a normal level of 
empathy will get worse with an increase in empathy: “with respect to moral subcapacities, 
excesses are as bad as deficiencies.”2 The suggestion is that an increase in a particular moral 
subcapacity above normal levels is likely to result in a morally extreme person such as, in 
Agar’s examples, someone who would burglarise a hospital or allow hundreds of millions of 
deaths.3 A flaw in this argument is that it considers only three possible types of moral 
judgement: moral judgement that is wrong because of deficient moral subcapacities, such as 
that of psychopaths; normal moral judgement; and extreme moral judgement, such as, again 
in Agar’s examples, that of terrorists or of doctors who carry out painful experiments on 
their children. There is, though, no obvious reason why it is not possible that there are also 
people who are morally exceptional, in the good sense, in particular ways. As the category 
 
2 An increase is not the same as an excess, but Agar’s argument implies that any increases in 
moral subcapacities above normal levels would be excessive. Otherwise he would not have his stated 
need for concern; he could accept moral bioenhancement that increased moral subcapacities to non-
excessive levels. 
3 Another interpretation of Agar’s argument might be that it holds not that increases in 
normal levels of subcapacities will result in extreme levels of those subcapacities, but instead that as 
extreme levels in a particular subcapacity are bad any increase in a particular subcapacity is also bad. 
But that would be a non-sequitur, so I believe the most charitable interpretation to be the one I 
employ. 
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of moral excellence is excluded from Agar’s considerations he is unlikely to arrive at a 
reliable prediction of the effects of changes in individuals’ moral subcapacities. 
Psychologists tell us that capacities such as empathy, moral motivation and moral 
reasoning do not exist on the three levels of deficient, normal and excessive, but on spectra. 
For example, empathy “is truly a continuum, a seamless dimension” (Baron-Cohen 2011: 202 
n. iv) and moral reasoning is also assessed on a continuum (Stepien and Baernstein 2006). 
This means that moral bioenhancement to increase a normal person’s particular moral  
subcapacity need not cause him or her to have an excessive level of that subcapacity. 
Normal levels of empathy are the middle range of a bell curve (Baron-Cohen 2011: 18); this 
means that an increase in the empathy of a morally normal person can result in him or her 
having a level of empathy still well within the normal range. Thus, there is no obvious 
reason why increases in empathy through bioenhancement would be likely to cause normal 
people to have levels of empathy at the far right of the bell curve. 
There seem to be many people with higher than normal levels of particular moral 
subcapacities who do not have bad moral judgement. For example, some people have high 
levels of empathy relative to their other subcapacities; they tend to help others in need more 
than most people do and to support organisations that work to reduce suffering, such as 
animal rights, medical or development charities.4 Some people have high levels of moral 
commitment relative to their other subcapacities; whereas other people might believe that 
there are major moral problems that need to be addressed but do nothing about them, those 
with high moral commitment take action to address those problems. Some people have high 
 
4 This is not to imply that the reverse is true, namely, that if a person works to reduce 
suffering they must do it due to high levels of empathy, and this is true, mutatis mutandis, of the 
examples of other high subcapacities that follow. 
7 
 
 
 
levels of the capacity for moral reasoning in relation to their other subcapacities; they 
include many of those who argued against racism, sexism and homophobia when those 
positions were the moral norm. It seems reasonable to think that having all moral 
subcapacities to a high degree is better than having one or two to a high degree, but it is not 
obvious that having one or two moral subcapacities to a high degree causes incorrect moral 
judgements, and it seems in most cases to just involve having strengths in particular moral 
areas. If so, there is nothing to fear from the bioenhancement of moral subcapacities to the 
level of morally exceptional people, even where those people have particular moral 
strengths. Further, a person with a pluralistic disposition will appreciate the variety of 
contributions to the moral sphere that variation in moral subcapacity balance creates. 
Take for example Baron-Cohen’s example of a person who has what he calls “super-
empathy,” Archbishop Desmond Tutu. He tells of Tutu struggling not to cry out loud when 
listening to victims’ testimony at the Truth and Reconciliation Hearings, which he chaired, 
and of his empathy extending towards white guards and officers, who Tutu recognized 
“deserved dignity and the opportunity to show remorse” and “experience forgiveness” 
(Baron-Cohen 2011: 187-188). The “super-empathy” of Desmond Tutu involves no 
dangerous moral judgement; rather, it seems to facilitate exceptional moral judgement. 
Baron-Cohen regards extreme empathy as “wholly positive” in its effects on others. To give 
another real-world example, empathy training for medical professionals, who we can 
presume tend to be morally normal, “is believed to significantly influence patient 
satisfaction, adherence to medical recommendations, clinical outcomes, and professional 
satisfaction” (Stepien and Baernstein 2006). These effects indicate improvements, not 
worsenings, in moral judgement. 
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Another indication that raising levels of empathy in normal people is not dangerous 
is the significant difference in average levels of empathy between men and women. This 
difference is well established (Toussaint and Webb 2005), and a study by Willer, Wimer and 
Owens (2015) attributes to it the lower rates of charitable giving by men. This illustrates 
three points. Firstly, it shows that there is not a single level or narrow band of normality for 
the moral subcapacity of empathy, as average empathy is significantly higher among 
women than men. Secondly, it shows that the enhancement of a moral subcapacity in a 
person with a normal level of that subcapacity need not cause an abnormal level of that 
subcapacity: a person with the average level of empathy for a man who has that level 
enhanced might then have the average level of empathy for a woman. Thirdly, it indicates 
that increasing particular moral subcapacities does not result in mistaken moral judgements. 
Presumably, women do not have worse moral judgement than men, and presumably, there 
is nothing faulty in women’s judgement that they should give at least the amount to charity 
that they do. In that case, it is reasonable to think that increasing the empathy of the average 
man will not result in worse moral judgements and will instead result in arguably better 
moral judgements, such as the judgement that they should give to charity at least the greater 
amount that women do. Now, there may not be the technical means to bioenhance empathy 
in this way; but the issue is not whether it is possible, but whether or not, if it were possible, 
it would be likely to result in mistaken moral judgements. And unless women’s higher level 
of giving to charity is mistaken, or women have worse moral judgement in general than men 
do, such bioenhancement is not likely to result in mistaken moral judgements. 
Thus Agar’s view that raising normal levels of a moral subcapacity is likely to result 
in incorrect moral judgements is undermined by the facts that moral subcapacities exist on 
9 
 
 
 
continua, not the three discrete levels of deficient, normal, and excessive; that having 
strength in a particular moral subcapacity can be beneficial, not harmful, for moral 
judgement; and by the empathy gap between men and women, which indicates that 
increasing the level of empathy in normal men to that of normal women would likewise not 
be harmful, and might be beneficial. 
Against normal moral judgement 
Agar fails to give sufficient reason to support the idea, contra Persson and Savulescu, 
that normal moral judgement is more likely to be correct than non-normal moral judgement. 
If normal moral judgement is not as likely to be correct as Agar implies, we have less reason 
to think that bioenhanced moral judgements are dangerous. 
Whereas Persson and Savulescu argue for the possible desirability of moral 
bioenhancement on the basis that normal moral judgment is dangerously flawed, Agar relies 
on normal moral judgement as a “reference point,” and appeals to “strongly felt moral 
intuitions” in support of moral normalcy. This is in danger of begging the question: the 
argument that non-normal moral intuitions are dangerously unreliable cannot easily be 
defended by appeal to normal moral intuitions without circularity. Persson and Savulescu 
take a consequentialist approach to moral questions, evaluating moral judgements by 
whether they cause benefit or harm; thus in the following discussion I will leave aside 
discussion of the epistemic status of moral intuition, for which there is not space here, and 
instead discuss whether normal moral judgements are more likely than bioenhanced 
judgements to cause benefit and avoid harm, broadly speaking. This seems compatible with 
Agar’s approach, as causing more harm than good is a reasonable interpretation of what he 
means by moral bioenhancement being “dangerous.” 
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Agar’s confidence in moral normalcy is illustrated in his discussion of his first 
hypothetical example of unbalanced moral subcapacities: 
Case A: A mother breaks into a hospital, steals a dialysis machine, and sells it on 
eBay to provide her child with a higher quality of education. 
Agar states that the mother has made an incorrect moral judgement as a result of 
giving excessive weight to the second of two moral ideas: 
Moral Idea One: Beings with a similar capacity to benefit and suffer harm deserve 
similar treatment. 
Moral Idea Two: Parents should give special consideration to their children. 
Agar suggests that moral normalcy involves a balance between the two ideas, and that the 
incorrect moral judgement of the mother results from her unusual weighting of Moral Idea 
Two and could occur in morally bioenhanced persons as “a possible result of the 
enhancement of the moral subcapacity of empathy.” 
It is not obvious that moral normalcy and strongly felt intuitions do have the balance 
of Moral Idea One and Moral Idea Two at the right level, if our measure is harmful and 
beneficial consequences. Consider the following case: 
Case X: It costs $14.21 to inoculate a child in sub-Saharan Africa from polio, 
diphtheria, pertussis, tuberculosis, and measles: painful, debilitating, and potentially 
fatal illnesses (Jamison et al. 2006). A parent has $160,000 and a child who is accepted 
into both MIT’s and Pennsylvania State University’s four-year programmes. MIT 
costs $40,000 per year. Penn State costs $30,000 per year. The parent can use the full 
$160,000 to pay for her child to attend the number five ranked MIT or send her to the 
number sixty-one ranked Penn State and use the saving of $40,000 to save 2815 
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children from possible pain, disability and death. She spends the $40,000 on a 
marginal improvement in her child’s education and lets the 2815 children take their 
chances. 
This is normal moral judgement: decisions like this happen countless times every 
day. Currently more than 30 million children are unimmunised from easily preventable 
diseases, and nearly 30,000 children under five die each day from preventable causes 
(UNICEF). 
Normal moral judgement places so much weight on Moral Idea Two relative to 
Moral Idea One that it already supports actions far more harmful than those in Case A, on a 
massive scale. In Case A, a single hospital may be hit with higher insurance costs. If there 
happens to be no other dialysis machine available the health and possibly life of a very small 
number of people may be affected. In Case X, of the 2815 impoverished children not 
protected from polio, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, tuberculosis and measles, many 
are likely to suffer death or permanent disability. It is precisely because normal moral 
judgement is so often harmful that Persson & Savulescu advocate moral education and 
consider the possibility of moral bioenhancement. One might object that consequentialist 
moral judgements of the kind I have used here are wrong; but we cannot hold that they are 
wrong and normal moral intuitions right on the basis of normal moral intuition without 
begging the question in favour of moral normalcy. 
Most importantly, there is no reason to think that any increase in weight given to 
Moral Idea One – beings with a similar capacity to benefit and suffer harm deserve similar 
treatment – must cause worse moral judgements, rather than a justified increase in concern 
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for strangers. Thus, there is no reason to think that any such increase caused by 
bioenhancement would be dangerous rather than beneficial. 
The argument Agar gives is that moral normalcy has the right balance, and that a 
change in that balance will likely result in dangerous moral judgements. Both premises are 
unconvincing: it is not obviously right for parents to prefer marginal increases in their own 
children’s wellbeing over massive increases in the wellbeing of a great number of other 
children to the extent that they do, and it is likely that parents can give some greater weight 
to the wellbeing of others’ children without making incorrect moral judgements. Thus there 
is some higher level of empathy for others such that moral bioenhancement to that level is 
not dangerous. 
Conclusion 
Although Persson and Savulescu consider the possibility of effective moral 
bioenhancement unlikely at present and possibly for the future, they suggest that given the 
grave consequences of continuing with the status quo the possibility of moral 
bioenhancement should not be dismissed without serious consideration. Agar’s argument 
that moral bioenhancement is likely to act by increasing particular moral subcapacities to 
dangerous levels is an interesting response. However, it fails in two ways. Firstly, in 
considering only three levels of moral subcapacities – deficient, normal, and excessive – 
Agar presents a false trichotomy, as he omits consideration of the category of exceptional 
moral judgement. His argument requires that increases in particular moral subcapacities 
from normal levels will leapfrog desirable higher levels and arrive at extreme levels, but 
gives insufficient reason to think this is likely. In fact, people commonly have varying levels 
of particular moral subcapacities without having poor moral judgement or extreme moral 
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views, and often with beneficial effects. Secondly, Agar does not justify the view that moral 
normalcy involves the right balance of moral subcapacities, and thus does not justify the 
view that morally bioenhanced judgements are likely to be incorrect. It may be that moral 
bioenhancement is dangerous; but Agar’s argument fails to justify that thesis.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 I’m grateful to Jacinta Cording, Richard Joyce, and an anonymous referee for their 
comments on previous drafts of this paper. 
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